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“Without the right to work, all other rights were meaningless.”1
“Being without money is hard, it makes you feel like less of a
man. You have no voice; no one will listen to you.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
“Work, or at least the aspiration to work, is ubiquitous.”3 Work is
transformative and provides a person not only with a means of paying for
the costs of life, but also with a sense of identification and value. Work
also allows for a sense of belonging to a community and is essential to
one’s sense of place in the world.4 For those who have fled persecution
1. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees and
Stateless Persons, 2d Sess., 37th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.37 (Sept. 16, 1950)
(statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States).
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & SETON HALL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, AT LEAST
LET THEM WORK: THE DENIAL OF WORK AUTHORIZATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (Nov. 2013) (citing Seton Hall interview with Bosco
N.) [hereinafter AT LEAST LET THEM WORK], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2013/11/12/least-let-them-work [http://perma.cc/39S4-2M99].
3. David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of Work, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 129 (1988) (discussing the importance of the ability to work).
4. This is particularly important in immigrant communities. For example, a study
of immigrant integration found that work is not merely a means of producing income, but
also provides a “purpose to life, it defines status and identity, and enables individuals to
establish relationships with others in the society . . . [t]herefore, for those who are out of
work, the result is not only a decline in psychological well-being, but also a delay in
adaptation.” Zeynep Aycan & John W. Berry, Impact of Employment-Related Experiences
on Immigrants’ Psychological Well-Being and Adaptation to Canada, 28 CANADIAN J.
BEHAV. SCI. 240, 248 (1996).
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and are seeking asylum protection in the United States, work takes on an
even greater importance. For the vast majority of asylum seekers, work
holds the key to economic survival, as federal law also precludes them
from accessing nearly any social benefits.5 Asylum seekers are only
entitled to a lawyer at their own expense—which may hinder their ability
to retain counsel and lessen the chances that they would be granted
asylum—so work is closely linked with the ability to afford a lawyer and
dramatically increases the chances of gaining protection.6 For asylum
seekers who suffer from mental health issues as a result of torture or
persecution, work is also a crucial element in recovery.7
Notwithstanding the essential nature of work for asylum seekers,
United States immigration law bars them from accessing employment for
at least six months and often for years.8 While their asylum claims
proceed, asylum seekers must remain idle, surviving only from the charity

5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2012). In order for asylum seekers to participate in
state or federal health insurance exchange programs and seek premium tax credits under
the Affordable Care Act, they must have employment authorization. See “Lawfully
Present” Individuals Under the Affordable Care Act, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Sept. 2012),
available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=809 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-1(g)
(2014); 77 Fed. Reg. 30, 377 (May 23, 2012)).
6. Studies show that those with lawyers are almost three times as likely to be
granted asylum in the United States. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) (“[W]hether an
asylum seeker is represented in court is the single most important factor affecting the
outcome of her case.” (citing Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel,
in INSIGHT, at 1, 5–6 (Migration Pol’y Inst., No. 4, 2005), available at http://www.
migrationpolicy.org/insight/InsightKerwin.pdf; Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for
Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: A Survey of Alternative Practices, in STUDY ON
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 232, 239 (2004); Andrew I. Schoenhotz &
Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 739, 739–40 (2002)).
7. See e.g., AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 30 (“Work may be the
single ‘most important thing’ in rehabilitating traumatized asylum seekers, said Dr. Joanne
Ahola, a medical doctor of both the Weill Cornell Center for Human Rights and Research
Institute Without Walls. . . . A job gives asylum seekers a sense of purpose and can
function as a ‘distraction from thinking about traumatic experiences.’”).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2012).
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of others.9 The only other option is to work without legal authorization and
risk exploitation and negative immigration consequences.10
Under international law, one becomes a refugee when the events giving
rise to such status take place rather than when the receiving country
affords such status.11 However, under United States immigration law,
only refugees, who have been granted asylum or who have had their
claims pending for at least 180 days through no fault of their own, are
eligible for employment authorization.12 Ostensibly, the United States
denies work authorization and public benefits to asylum seekers to deter
“economic migrants” from filing fraudulent asylum applications to work

9. See AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 27–31 (documenting the
emotional toll caused by forcing asylum seekers to remain idle and dependent on others).
10. For example, United States immigration law imposes a ten-year bar on
readmission for any alien who has been in the country unlawfully for at least one year and
then departs. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2012). To avoid penalizing asylum seekers,
Congress carved out an exception for time during which an asylum seeker has a pending
bona fide asylum application. See § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II). However, this exception does not
apply if the asylum seeker worked without authorization. See id. (“No period of time in
which an alien has a bona fide application for asylum pending under [8 U.S.C. §
1158] shall be taken into account in determining the period of unlawful presence in the
United States under clause (i) unless the alien during such period was employed without
authorization in the United States.”) (emphasis added). See also Bar on Work
Authorization Creates Hardship, REFUGEE R., June 30, 1996, at 6–7 (noting that the denial
of work authorization and social benefits to asylum seekers in the United States has resulted in
more homelessness, psychological deterioration, stress, illegal work, exploitation,
and begging).
11. James C. Hathaway & Annie K. Cusick, Refugee Rights Are Not Negotiable, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 481, 484–85 (2000). As refugee scholars have noted, states try to avoid
their obligations to refugees by denying them that title, or even that of asylum seeker and
instead, labeling them as “‘displaced persons,’ ‘illegal immigrants,’ ‘economic migrants,’
‘quasi-refugees,’ ‘aliens,’ ‘departees,’ ‘boat people,’ or ‘stowaways.’” GUY S. GOODWINGILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (3d ed. 2007).
12. § 1158(d)(2).
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lawfully.13 The denial of work authorization is also part of a broader effort
to deter asylum seekers from coming to the United States.14
This Article critiques the United States’ bar on employment for asylum
seekers on a number of fronts. Beginning with a historical perspective, I
explore the more humane regime that existed in the United States until
1995. Under this prior system, asylum seekers with bona fide claims were
permitted to work while their claims proceeded. This Article examine the
underlying fears and policy goals that led Congress to dramatically curtail
protection and the right to work for asylum seekers. By situating the
prohibition on work for asylum seekers within the larger context of overall
punitive immigration reforms and the increasing criminalization of
immigration law, this Article argues that the ban on employment for
asylum seekers is unnecessary as a means to deter fraud. It also argues
that it is inconsistent with other humanitarian immigration relief that
exists in United States immigration law.
Turning to the Refugee Convention itself, it is argued that denying
refugees seeking asylum the right to work violates the spirit of the Refugee
Convention and the very right to seek asylum.15 This Article further argues
13. See JOHN COLLETT, SOCIAL WORK, IMMIGRATION, AND ASYLUM 78 (Debra Hayes &
Beth Humphries, eds., 2004). Such arguments are premised on the distinction between
“deserving” true refugees and undeserving “economic migrants.” Id. This distinction fails
to capture the nuances in migration and the mix of persecution and economic harm that
may be the impetus for fleeing. “The poverty people are escaping is often tied in with the
political and social malaise a country is experiencing: ‘by suggesting that there are “genuine”
people that are forced out of their homes by persecution and war, on the one hand, and
those who simply seek a better life, on the other, the simplistic and unhelpful dichotomy
between an asylum-seeker and an economic migrant . . . is perpetuated. In reality, “the
same situations of societal transformations and crisis linked to war, poverty, and nationstate formation” contribute to a mixed flow of asylum seekers and economic migrants.”
In this context, to question whether people leave out of desperation or aspiration is
irrelevant. They seek to escape from social, economic and/or political insecurity to a more
secure future.” P. Kahn, Asylum-Seekers in the UK: Implications for Social Service
Involvement, 8 SOC. WORK & SOC. SCI. REV. 116, 121 (2000).
14. The United States utilizes a broad array of tactics to deter asylum seekers from
accessing its territory, including mandatory detention and denial of employment authorization.
Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 625, 627, 629 (2009). See also GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 11, at 50
(“[T]he developed world, in particular, expends considerable energy in trying to find ways
to prevent claims for protection being made at their borders, or to allow for them to be
summarily passed on or back to others.”).
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (guaranteeing a right to seek asylum).
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that denying a means of support and attempting to make life so difficult
that asylum seekers choose to return home to persecution rather than seek
protection amounts to constructive nonrefoulement in violation of the
Refugee Convention.
Finally, from a policy perspective, this Article argues that allowing
asylum seekers to work while their claims proceed would restore dignity
to refugees and realign U.S. immigration policy with important international
law norms. It would also be consistent with domestic immigration policy for
other classes of similarly situated vulnerable immigrants. Additionally,
in light of the heightened enforcement efforts and more restrictive
immigration regime which now exists in the United States, it is unlikely
that the number of fraudulent asylum applications filed would significantly
increase.
II. DEHUMANIZING THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
The number of people seeking asylum protection around the world
continues to climb. In 2014, 866,000 people sought asylum in industrialized
countries, an increase of 45% from the prior year.16 The United States
received the second highest number of these asylum claims.17 In 2014,
approximately 121,200 new asylum claims were filed in the United States, a
44% increase from the prior year.18 While the number of people fleeing
persecution and torture in their homelands continues to climb dramatically,
countries around the world are making it harder for these refugees to gain
access to asylum protection.19
One way the United States and other countries have made it harder for
refugees to seek protection is by removing any means of self-sufficiency
during the asylum adjudication process. Those refugees who are lucky
enough to be admitted to the United States lawfully—or who enter the
country without being detected—have one year in which to seek asylum
protection.20 These refugees are not allowed to work or to receive any
social benefits unless either they are granted asylum or more than six
months have passed without a decision through no fault of the asylum

16. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR ASYLUM TRENDS 2014, LEVELS
AND TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 2 (2015), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
551128679.html [http://perma.cc/E7PW-AJG5].
17. Id. While the United States was the industrialized nation with the highest number
of asylum claims for seven consecutive years, Germany has outplaced the United
States for the past two years. Id.
18. Id.
19. Nessel, supra note 14, at 627–28.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(b) (2012).
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seeker.21 Asylum seekers are thus left with a Hobson’s choice: rush to
present their cases in hopes of gaining asylum and the right to work—but
risk not having sufficient time to adequately prepare the case—or take
time to prepare their cases and forego the possibility of working while the
case proceeds. Adding another layer to the dilemma is the fact that there
is no right to free counsel in asylum proceedings.22 The only way to
proceed with counsel is to hire a lawyer, a prospect undermined by the
inability to work.23
A. The System before “Reform”
Asylum seekers in the United States have not always had to choose
between destitution and inadequately prepared asylum applications. When
the Refugee Act was implemented in 1980, Congress’s intention was to
bring United States law into harmony with its obligations under the U.N.
Refugee Convention.24 From 1980 until 1987, the district director at the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had discretion as to
whether to grant employment authorization to an alien who was seeking
asylum.25 In 1987, after a class action challenge where a district court
21. § 1158(d)(2).
22. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (2014); Yunie Hong & Timothy Griffiths, A Matter of Life
and Death: Asylum Seekers’ Lack of Access to Competent Legal Representation, LEGAL
SERVICES OF N. CAL., http://equity.lsnc.net/a-matter-of-life-and-death-asylum-seekers’lack-of-access-to-competent-legal-representation [http://perma.cc/K6T4-JPRB] (last visited
June 9, 2015).
23. Id. (“Even if jobs were plentiful, asylum seekers cannot simply work to earn the
money they need to pay for an attorney, because they cannot get employment authorization
until after their cases have been filed and pending for at least 6 months–and that’s the
best case scenario.”).
24. The United States ratified the Refugee Convention in 1968 when it signed the
U.N. Optional Protocol on Refugees (incorporating the Refugee Convention). RUTH
ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32621, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS, 3 (2005), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32621.pdf [http://
perma.cc/39GD-S47Z]. From 1968 to 1980, the United States did not have a domestic law
on refugee protection and instead relied upon ad hoc legislation and discretion. Id.
25. See Employment Authorization, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,563 (Mar. 26, 1980) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 109). Former 8 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(2) provided that “[a]ny alien
who has filed a non-frivolous application for asylum pursuant to Part 208 of this chapter
may be granted permission to be employed for the period of time necessary to decide the
case.” Former 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 provided that “[u]pon the filing of a nonfrivolous I-589,
the district director may, in his discretion, grant a request by the applicant for
employment authorization.” Once granted, employment authorization could be revoked
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judge found a likelihood of irreparable harm if the district director was
allowed to continue to deny employment authorizations to asylum seekers,26
the INS promulgated new regulations guaranteeing a right to employment
authorization in all nonfrivolous cases.27 For the next eight years, a refugee
in need of protection could apply for asylum and the right to work
simultaneously.28 As long as the government did not find the application
for asylum to be frivolous, it granted employment authorization so that the
asylum seeker could pay for the basic necessities of life and survive while
the claim was adjudicated.29
This system of allowing asylum seekers to work and support themselves
while their cases proceeded was consistent with the magnitude of the
interest at stake. As the Court in National Center for Immigrants Rights
found, “The hardship [to aliens] from being unable to work to support
themselves and their dependents . . . is beyond question.”30
However, cases proceeded slowly because of a growing backlog. When
the Asylum Corps was first established to adjudicate affirmative asylum
claims, it expected that it would decide about 70,000 claims per year.31
But by 1992, 103,000 people filed affirmative asylum claims in the United
States.32 The following year, 150,000 people sought asylum in the United
States.33 As the backlog of asylum cases continued to mount, adjudication
slowed down. Additionally, because the immigration regime at the time
did not include the myriad of enforcement and deterrent mechanisms that

under some circumstances. Pursuant to former 8 C.F.R. § 109.2(a), “[e]mployment
authorization granted under § 109.1(b) of this part may be revoked by the district director
when it appears that one or more of the conditions upon which it was granted no longer
exist, or for good cause shown.”
26. Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638, 657 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (granting a preliminary
injunction prohibiting denial and revocation of work authorization until adjudication
process for asylum claim had been completed). As the judge found, “I am hard pressed to
see how placing a refugee in a position where he or she must break the law to survive
during the years it may take for a decision on a political asylum application cannot be
considered an irreparable hardship.” Id. at 648.
27. Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,216, 16,226 (May 1, 1987)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a).
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1369 (1984).
31. History of the United States Asylum Officer Corps, AM. IMMIGR. L. CENTER,
http://www.ailc.com/services/asylum/history.htm#F [http://perma.cc/26ME-YRW9] (last
visited Feb. 10, 2015).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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exist today, asylum seekers who gained employment authorization could
evade removal if the asylum claim was ultimately denied.34
Although it stands to reason that there must have been some degree of
fraud taking place, greatly exaggerated accounts of rampant abuse picked up
traction in the media, including allegations that anyone could get a work
permit by uttering the words “political asylum.”35 This caused a flurry of
activity in Congress.36 During congressional hearings on asylum reform,
the number of asylum applications was characterized as a “torrent” and as a
“giant cascade.”37
David Martin, an immigration scholar and former general counsel to
INS, recounted a mix of political factors that led to the decoupling of
asylum and employment authorization.38 For example, just one week into the
new Clinton administration, a lone gunman who opened fire outside the
CIA headquarters in northern Virginia, killing two, was identified as a
Pakistani national who allegedly entered the United States illegally and
gained an extended stay in this country, with work authorization, as an
asylum applicant.39 In addition, “some [of the men] charged in the World
Trade Center bombing a month later also turned out to be asylum
applicants who had stayed in the United States as part of the backlog.”40

34. Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing on H.R. 1153, H.R. 1355, and H.R.
1679 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1–3 (1993) (statement of Romano L. Mazzoli, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Int’l Law, Immigration, and Refugees).
35. See e.g., Ira H. Mehlman, The New Jet Set: Think the Rio Grande Is a Porous
Border? Try New York’s JFK, Where Anyone Can Enter Through the Magic of Political
Asylum, NAT’L REV., Mar. 15, 1993, at 40, 60 (referring to a Liberian asylum seeker at
JFK airport and asserting that “[o]nce he utters ‘political asylum’ his chances of remaining
in the United States are 93%.”). According to the article, the asylum officer at JFK airport
complained, “We’re being deluged. It’s scandalous . . . In a matter of hours he’s going to
be walking out onto the street joining the ranks of the unemployed. We don’t know
anything about him. We don’t know if he has AIDS. We don’t know if he’s a murderer.”
Id.
36. Tim Weiner, Pleas for Asylum Inundate System for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1993, at A1 (discussing how immigrants, including one of the suspects in the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, “can arrive at an airport having destroyed [their] travel
documents, [and] plead for asylum” before disappearing).
37. Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra note 34, at 1.
38. David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV.
725, 738–39 (1995).
39. Id. at 737.
40. Id. at 737–38.
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The media stoked the coals even further with its reporting on fraud and
asylum. For example, the television program, 60 Minutes, aired a segment
showing individuals destroying their identity documentation upon arrival
at Kennedy airport in New York in order to seek asylum.41 Even without
any proof of identity, “many were simply released, with work authorization . . .
and few ever appeared for their . . . hearings in immigration court.”42
Adding to the perfect storm, “several large ships were reported on both
coasts discharging passengers, mostly Chinese, at unauthorized locations.
The Golden Venture, which ran aground off Long Island in June 1993,
became the best known smuggler’s vessel. Many of its desperate passengers
tried to swim to shore,” and those that survived sought asylum.”43 These
events, and the widespread media attention, had a strong impact on
lawmakers.
Bills aimed at dramatically revamping the asylum regime began to
churn through Congress. There were calls for mandatory detention for all
asylum seekers and a requirement that asylum applications be lodged
within days of entering the country.44 This crisis mentality, and the fear
that asylum itself was at stake, led some prominent refugee rights advocates
to support efforts to limit the right to work for asylum seekers.45
Ultimately, the Clinton Administration acted to address this situation.
It added more asylum officers and put new provisions in place to reduce
the backlog of cases and make asylum processing more efficient.46 It also
bifurcated the process for seeking asylum from that of seeking work
authorization.47 Pursuant to the new regulations, an “asylum clock” would
start running once the applicant submitted a complete asylum application.48
The applicant was then required to wait until the clock had registered at
41. Id. at 738.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bill Frelick, U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers and Human Rights, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-detention-asylumseekers-and-human-rights [http://perma.cc/F8PE-DTRK].
45. According to David Martin, “the traditional refugee advocacy groups proved
quite willing to engage with the Administration in considering a wide range of reform
ideas. Their hope was to head off the scariest of the legislative proposals by showing that
the genuine problems of the system could be mastered, that abuses could be defeated, by
other means that still preserved a genuine opportunity for asylum for those in real need.”
Martin, supra note 38, at 738–39.
46. Ron Fournier, Immigration Curbs Sought—Clinton Seeks To Add Border
Agents, Speed Asylum Reviews, THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 1993, http://community.
seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19930727&slug=1712986 [http://perma.cc/L4VYZV9M].
47. Martin, supra note 38, at 753–54.
48. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1) (2014).
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least 150 days before submitting a request for work authorization.49 At
that point, the government had thirty days to consider the work
authorization application.50 In addition, under the new regulations, “any
delay requested or caused by the applicant” would stop the clock until
proceedings were restarted.51 Furthermore, the regulations clarified that an
asylum seeker would not start to accrue time toward work authorization if he
or she “fail[ed] to appear for a scheduled interview before an asylum officer
or a hearing before an immigration judge.”52 When Congress dramatically
altered the immigration landscape in 1996 with its passage of the restrictive
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
these revised employment authorization regulations for asylum seekers
officially became law.53
This reformed immigration regime had a devastating impact on an asylum
seeker’s right to work. Except in those unusual instances where asylum
was granted sooner, applicants for asylum could no longer secure work
authorization for at least 180 days after filing their asylum application, and
often much longer if applicants requested an adjournment at any point.54
IIRIRA is even harsher for applicants who have been denied asylum or
asylum seekers renewing their work authorization. If an asylum officer
denies asylum to an applicant previously granted work authorization, that
authorization terminates sixty days after the denial or upon the expiration of
the authorization, whichever time period is longer.55 If an immigration
judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or a federal court denies asylum,
“employment authorization terminates upon the expiration of the . . .
document,” unless the applicant appropriately appeals.56 A government
appeal of a grant of asylum does not affect an asylum seeker’s work

49. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2).
50. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1).
51. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2).
52. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(4).
53. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, §§ 401–405, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-655 to -666 (1996); see 8 U.S.C. §
1158(d)(2) (2012).
54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2) (“Any delay requested or
caused by the applicant shall not be counted as part of these time periods, including delays
caused by the failure without good cause to follow the requirements for fingerprint processing.”).
55. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.7(b)(1) (2014).
56. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.7(b)(2).
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authorization eligibility throughout the appeals process.57 An applicant who
has been denied asylum before receiving work authorization, however, is not
eligible to apply for work authorization, regardless if the applicant appeals.58
Perhaps the harshest provision is that an asylum seeker who did not appear
at a scheduled interview or hearing may not even apply for work
authorization until asylum is granted, unless the applicant can show
“exceptional circumstances.”59
B. Pressure Mounts to Ameliorate the Harshest Aspects
of the New “Asylum Clock”
Although some prominent advocates involved in the process initially
accepted the work authorization reforms, believing that this was a way to
save the asylum regime from being gutted altogether,60 the majority of
comments received in response to the proposed regulatory changes were
quite negative and foresaw the dangers ahead.61 Commentators warned
of the undue hardship these changes would impose on asylum seekers and
cited interference with the right to seek asylum and with due process
guarantees.62 There was also fear of a heightened risk of exploitation, as
asylum seekers would be pushed into the black market for employment.63
By 2011, the Ombudsman from the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) recommended changes to the way the
government managed the asylum clock, including greater transparency
and clearer communication as to the workings of the clock.64 By 2012, a
group of asylum seekers filed a class action against the Department of
Homeland Security, claiming that its policies and practices regarding the
asylum clock deprived them of the opportunity to obtain employment
authorization, fair notice of decisions regarding employment authorization,

57. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(c)(3).
58. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.7(a)(1).
59. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(4).
60. Martin, supra note 38, at 743.
61. Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum or
Withholding of Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 62284,
62290–91 (Dec. 5, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-12-05/html/94-29724.htm [http://perma.cc/GQ29-HDPJ].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR ASYLUM APPLICANTS: RECOMMENDATIONS TO
IMPROVE COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 4–6 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb-employment-authorization-for-asylum-08262011.pdf [http://perma.
cc/Z38D-XZTG].
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and a means of correcting erroneous decisions.65 Indeed, the government
statistics showed that the system was not functioning in the way it had
been envisioned, for example, with asylum seekers waiting no more than
150 days before being eligible to seek employment authorization—assuming
there was no delay attributable to the applicant. Rather, between 2007
and May 2011, there were 285,101 pending cases before the immigration
courts.66 Of those pending cases, 262,025 (91.9%) had their employment
authorization clocks stopped at some point.67
The hardship such delays cause to asylum seekers has been well
documented. In 2010, Penn State Law School’s Center for Immigrants’
Rights joined with the American Immigration Council’s Legal Action
Center to issue a comprehensive report detailing problems with the asylum
clock system and calling for reform.68 In 2013, Seton Hall Law School and
Human Rights Watch released a human rights report documenting the physical
and emotional harm that comes with enforced destitution.69
In April 2013, the government agreed to a settlement in the class action
litigation challenging the flagrant violations of the asylum clock system.70
The settlement terms aimed to increase transparency and soften some of the
harshest aspects of the asylum employment authorization clock. For
example, prior to the settlement, an asylum applicant who failed to appear

65. Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at 1–2, 4, A.B.T. v. U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Serv., No. C11-2108-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2013) [hereinafter A.B.T.
Motion], available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Asylum
Clock-Motion-Exhibits-Order-12-20-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/62ML-2CZU].
66. Id. at 9; A.B.T. Motion, exhibit 1, at 2–3.
67. Id.
68. See JESÚS SAUCEDO & DAVID RODRIGUEZ, PENN STATE LAW’S CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS FOR AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL’S LEGAL ACTION CTR., UP AGAINST THE
CLOCK: FIXING THE BROKEN EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION ASYLUM CLOCK 2–3 (2010),
available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Asylum_Clock_
Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PV8-EXWJ].
69. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 28. For example, a Rwandan rapesurvivor recounts the depression that came with not being able to work for years while her
asylum claim was pending. She explains, “[j]ust sitting on your own, one year, two years,
three years, five, doing nothing, just sitting there, kills you. I was so depressed.” Id. Other
asylum seekers spoke of feelings of “worthlessness” and of “being nothing without a work
permit.” Id. at 29.
70. Settlement Agreement at 17–18, A.B.T. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv.,
No. C11-2108-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2013) [hereinafter A.B.T. Settlement Agreement],
available at http://legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/60-1Settlement%20Agreement.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LQH3-YKX5].
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for an interview or hearing date would be barred from receiving employment
authorization during the asylum-seeking process, unless the applicant
could show exceptional circumstances for missing the interview or hearing.71
Under the terms of the settlement, the government is now required to send
a letter to an applicant who misses an interview or hearing, which notifies
such person about the consequences it has on employment authorization,
and allow forty-five days to demonstrate “good cause” for failing to appear.”72
Prior to the settlement, asylum seekers appearing in court before an
immigration judge would often find their cases adjourned without
explanation.73 Under the terms of the settlement agreement, judges are
now required to state, on the record, the reasons for adjourning a hearing.74
Judges must also allow asylum seekers forty-five days before scheduling
an expedited hearing date—previously, judges only had to allow fourteen
days.75 For the small number of asylum seekers who appeal and win their
cases, the settlement now requires that the asylum seeker be credited with
the number of days that elapsed between the initial denial of asylum to the
date of the order remanding the case.76 While this is an improvement from
the prior system, where none of this time on appeal was counted toward
employment authorization, asylum seekers will still be left without
employment authorization until there is a remand, unless they had
accrued 150 days prior to the appeal.77 Finally, asylum seekers are now
allowed to submit their asylum applications with the court clerk and use
that submission date to start the employment authorization clock—rather than
waiting to submit at the hearing date. 78 Although the settlement
agreement ameliorates the lack of transparency and chips away at some of
the most egregious aspects of the asylum clock, it does not address the
inherent inequities or dangers in conditioning asylum on the refugee’s
ability to withstand destitution.
III. ANALYZING ASYLUM REFORM WITHIN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF
A MORE RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME
While the asylum reforms of 1995 and 1996 reduced the backlog in
cases, there is no evidence to establish that the reduction was attributable
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(4) (2014).
A.B.T. Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, at 17–18.
A.B.T. Motion, supra note 65, at 4.
A.B.T. Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, at 15.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
See id.
Id. at 16.
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to the denial of employment authorization to asylum seekers. Rather, it is
likely that increasing the number of asylum officers, speeding up the
processing of asylum claims, and weeding out fraudulent asylum claims
played a much greater role in reducing the backlog. In 1995, prior to the
reforms, “the INS had 325 asylum officers, 149,566 new asylum claims,”
and a backlog of 457,670 pending cases.79 In 2013, USCIS had fewer
asylum officers than in 1995; even with only 279 asylum officers, USCIS
received 44,453 new asylum claims and only had a backlog of 32,560
cases.80 Whereas the ratio of new asylum claims to officers was 693-to1, not including the massive backlog of cases; in 1992, the ratio of new
applicants to officers was down to 159-to-1 in 2013.81
While the law barring asylum seekers from employment authorization
and governmental benefits has remained frozen in time since its adoption
in 1996, the broader immigration landscape has dramatically shifted such that
these restrictions have become obsolete. The reforms have created real
disincentives to filing for asylum as a guise for securing work
authorization. For example, prior to the employment authorization reforms,
an asylum seeker could apply for asylum and employment authorization
and work for years while the claim moved slowly through the adjudication
and appeals process.82 Once the asylum seeker accrued seven years in the
United States, the asylum seeker could seek to suspend deportation if it
could be shown that deportation would result in extreme hardship to an
79. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 15 (citing Asylum Cases Filed with
Immigration and Naturalization Service Asylum Officers, Approved, Denied, and Referred
After Interview, by Selected Nationalities, April 1991–September 1995, REFUGEE REP., Dec.
31, 1995, at 12.).
80. Id. (citing Telephone Interview by Human Rights Watch with David Pilotti, HQ
Asylum Branch Chief – Mgmt., USCIS (Oct. 11, 2013)).
81. Id. Although the asylum offices are currently experiencing significant backlogs,
USCIS is hiring hundreds of additional officers to address the situation. See CHERI ATTIX, AM.
IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, THE AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM BACKLOG EXPLAINED, 2 (2014),
available at https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/AILA_Explanation
%20of%20the%20Affirmative%20Asylum%20Backlog_4.2.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMB2MFFP].
82. As one scholar notes, “[d]uring the late 1990s a queue of appeals to the BIA
created delays in hearing cases that in turn encouraged some noncitizens to file appeals
merely for the benefit of delay.” See Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to
Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2006) (citing Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of
Immigration Appeals Procedures (Aug. 23, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2002/08/26/BIARestruct.pdf [http://perma.cc/FNH9-92LD]).
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immediate family member who was a United States citizen or a lawful
permanent resident.83 In 1996, Congress removed this immigration remedy
(known as “Suspension of Deportation”)84 and replaced it with a much
more limited form of relief known as “Cancellation of Removal.”85 In
order to be eligible for this more restrictive provision, an asylum seeker
needs to accrue ten years in the United States without being placed in
removal proceedings.86 Because of the requirement that the immigrant
accrue ten years prior to being placed in removal proceedings, there is no
longer any incentive to appeal in hopes of accruing time for cancellation of
removal.87 Congress also changed the showing of hardship to immediate
family if the applicant were deported from “extreme hardship”88 to
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”89 Finally, the exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship standard no longer applies to the applicant,
but only to a United States citizen or to a spouse, parent, or child who is a
lawfully permanent resident.90 All of these statutory changes have
resulted in a more restrictive regime for gaining asylum relief that effectively
blunts any attempt to file for asylum simply for the goal of securing work
authorization.
Congress also implemented a system of expedited removal aimed at
dramatically reducing the backlog of cases. Under this system, an
immigration officer stationed at a port of entry is empowered to determine
whether to quickly remove a person who has improper or no documentation
or to allow them to seek asylum.91 “If the officer believes that [the person]
does not have a credible fear of persecution,” the officer has the power to

83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (repealed in 1996); H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
IMMIGRATION IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST ACT OF 1995, H.R. REP. NO. 104–469, pt. 1, at
122 (1996) (expressing concern that, “[s]uspension of deportation is often abused by aliens
seeking to delay proceedings until 7 years have accrued. This includes aliens who failed
to appear for their deportation proceedings and were ordered deported in absentia, and
then seek to re-open proceedings once the requisite time has passed. Such tactics are
possible because some Federal courts permit aliens to continue to accrue time toward the
seven year threshold even after they have been placed in deportation proceedings.”).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (repealed in 1996).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012).
86. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
87. See id.
88. 8 U.S.C. §1254a(e) (2012).
89. § 1229b.
90. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (establishing that “removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence”).
91. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HEARING ON “ASYLUM ABUSE: IS IT
OVERWHELMING OUR BORDERS?” 7 (2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
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“order the [person] removed . . . without further hearing or review.”92
Credible fear is a lower standard than “well-founded,” which is required
for a grant of asylum;93 credible fear “means that there is a significant
possibility . . . that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.”94 This
process was implemented to “target the perceived abuses of the asylum
process by restricting the hearing, review, and appeal process for aliens at
a port of entry.”95
Moreover, any person with fraudulent or no documentation, who presents
himself or herself to an immigration officer at a port of entry, must be
detained pending the credible fear determination.96 If that person is “found
not to have such a fear,” he or she is removed.97 Mandatory detention thus
makes it easier to monitor persons who purport to seek asylum and then
remove them from the United States if their pleas for asylum are deemed
not to meet the credible fear standards of asylum law. If, on the other
hand, an officer or immigration judge concludes that a person does have
a credible fear of persecution in his or her home country, the person may
be released until the full case is heard before a judge,98 but most often remains
in detention and must present a claim within those confines.99
In enacting IIRIRA, Congress made additional revisions to existing law,
which further restricted an asylum seeker’s ability to seek protection. For
example, Congress imposed a one-year time limit for seeking asylum
92. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(2012); Asylum in the United States, IMMIGR. POL’Y
CTR. (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/asylum-united-states
[http://perma.cc/PBK6-PFW9].
94. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
95. WASEM, supra note 91, at 7.
96. WASEM, supra note 91, at 7–8; § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
97. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
98. WASEM, supra note 91, at 5.
99. Letter from Robin M. Stutman, Gen. Counsel of U.S. Dep’t of Justice Exec.
Office for Immigration Review, to Mary Meg McCarthy, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Immigrant
Justice Ctr, Petition for Rulemaking to Promulgate Regulations Governing Custody
Determinations for Arriving Alien Asylum Seekers (Mar. 19, 2012) (“The great majority
of aliens who assert a credible fear of persecution or torture are found to have such fear;
in fiscal year 2009, DHS made positive credible fear findings in 79.7 percent of cases
involving arriving aliens that proceeded to a decision.”); Credible Fear Workload Report
Summary: FY 2012 Total Caseload, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (2012),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%2
0Engagements/2012/December%202012/Credible-Reasonable-workloadsFY12.pdf [http://
perma.cc/M363-XZSP].
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protection.100 This seemingly arbitrary temporal limitation on asylum has
been sharply criticized by human rights advocates because it deprives many
deserving refugees of protection.101 In addition, anyone who has traveled
through a “safe-third country” prior to seeking asylum in the United States
is now barred from asylum protection.102 Asylum seekers who have previously
applied for, but were denied, asylum are also ineligible.103 Finally, if the
Attorney General determines that an asylum seeker submitted a frivolous
application, the asylum seeker becomes “permanently ineligible for any
[asylum] benefits.”104
In addition to removing asylum eligibility for refugees who waited over
a year to apply, traveled through a safe third country, were denied protection
in the past, or previously submitted a fraudulent application, Congress
dramatically restricted immigration relief more generally and focused
greater resources on heightened enforcement measures. The IIRIRA
focused almost exclusively on border security and strengthening interior
enforcement against undocumented immigrants.105 Congress allocated
a dramatic increase in resources for personnel, physical barriers, and
technology at the border,106 and authorized additional funding for more
Federal prosecutors, detention facilities, and the actual removal of
undocumented immigrants with removal orders.107 The IIRIRA also
established a pilot program for employer electronic verification of workers’
identities and work authorizations108 and substantially increased civil and
criminal penalties for alien smuggling, document and other fraud, as well
as other miscellaneous immigration-related offenses.109 It also created the
three and ten year bars to reentry for immigrants who were previously
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). The only exception to this time limit is if the
applicant can show that there were certain “changed circumstances which materially
affect[ed] the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to
the delay in filing” the asylum application. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
101. See, e.g., The Asylum Filing Deadline: Denying Protection to the Persecuted
and Undermining Governmental Efficiency, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Sept. 2010), http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/afd.pdf [http://perma.cc/AYH2-PKHQ].
102. WASEM, supra note 91, at 8; § 1158(a)(2)(A). That third country must be a
signatory to the Refugee Convention and one with which the United States has a special
treaty and that would afford the asylum seeker a “full and fair procedure” to determine
asylum eligibility in that country. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
103. WASEM, supra note 91, at 8; § 1158(a)(2)(C).
104. WASEM, supra note 91, at 8–9; § 1158(d)(6).
105. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
106. Id. §§ 101–12.
107. Id. §§ 204, 131–34, 385, 386.
108. Id. §§ 401–05.
109. Id. §§ 202, 203, 211–20, 321–34.
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unlawfully present in the United States, expanded the crime-related and
terrorism-related removal grounds, restricted the availability of discretionary
remedies, and narrowed the procedural rights previously applicable in
removal proceedings.110 The Act broadened, and in some circumstances
mandated, the use of preventive detention in connection with removal
proceedings.111
Whereas appealing a denial of asylum in the past often resulted in years of
employment authorization while the case sat before a backlogged Board of
Appeals, in 1999 the Board of Immigration Appeals began streamlining
adjudication of appeals.112 In August 2002, the Department of Justice
promulgated new rules aimed at procedural reforms to the Board of
Immigration Appeals and reducing the backlog of cases.113 The new rules
changed the appeals process so that most cases would be decided by a
single Board member rather than a three-member panel.114 It also allowed
for a single Board member to summarily dismiss an appeal prior to briefing
or to issue an “affirmance without opinion,” substantially reducing
the amount of time necessary for issuing decisions.115
Moreover, since 1996 Congress has enacted additional legislation aimed at
increasing enforcement measures and making immigration laws less
generous or forgiving. For example, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001,116 which:

110. Id. §§ 301–58.
111. Id. § 305.
112. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR Publishes Final Rule for Streamlining
Appeals Process (Oct. 18 1999) (on file with author).
113. “The preamble to the proposed rules states that the ‘Procedural Reforms’ are
intended to: (1) eliminate the backlog of approximately 55,000 cases pending before the
BIA, (2) eliminate unwarranted delays in the adjudication of administrative appeals, (3)
utilize BIA resources more efficiently, and (4) allow more resources to be allocated to the
resolution of those cases that present difficult or controversial legal questions.” DORSEY &
WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS:
PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 20 (2003) (citing Board of
Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg.
7309, 7310 (proposed Feb. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3)), available at
http://www.dorsey.com/files/Upload/DorseyStudyABA.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW9C-K6F6?
type=pdf].
114. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 113, at 20.
115. Id. at 17.
116. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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[B]uilt on previous restrictions and introduced a series of new measures that
broadened terrorism-related grounds for removal, narrowed the possibilities for
discretionary relief, reinforced border security, expanded detention, and streamlined
the procedures for removing alien terrorists. Five years later, the REAL ID Act
of 2005 again expanded grounds of inadmissibility, further restricted judicial
review in immigration proceedings, prohibited the issuance of driver’s licenses
to undocumented individuals, and mandated various security procedures relating
to applications for drivers’ licenses. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 bolstered
existing border security measures by mandating 700 miles of fencing along the
Southern border. . . . Overall, in the years following the attacks of September 11,
2001, Federal laws enacted in the immigration realm have focused almost entirely on
interior enforcement and border security.117

Not surprisingly, in light of the dramatically increased spending in this
area, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has carried out a
record high number of immigrant removals from the United States.118
If the motive for restricting the right to work was to reduce fraud and
provide a disincentive to seeking asylum solely to gain employment
authorization, such a restriction is no longer necessary in light of the current
harsh refugee regime. At the same time, the Executive Branch has focused
greater resources on enforcement actions and achieved record high numbers
of removals. In addition, the Board of Immigration Appeals revamped its
processes to streamline decision-making and diminish the backlog of cases.
While in no way condoning the punitive regime facing asylum seekers,
also forcing poverty upon asylum seekers is immoral and superfluous as
a means of avoiding fraudulent asylum claims.

117. BORDER SECURITY, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND IMMIGRATION MODERNIZATION
ACT, S. REP. NO. 113-40, pt. 1, at 15 (2013) (citations omitted). Congress has also adopted
other measures to bolster immigration enforcement. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, §§ 5101–5204, 118 Stat. 3638,
3732–35 (containing several border security and immigration enforcement provisions,
including authorization of an increase of at least 2000 Border Patrol agents and 800 ICE
agents); Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port) Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-347, 120 Stat. 1884; Jamie Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force Act, Pub.
L. No. 112-205, 126 Stat. 1487 (2012).
118. Ben Winograd, Clearing up the Controversy over the Number of ICE “Removals,”
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL: IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Sept. 10, 2012), http://immigration
impact.com/2012/09/10/clearing-up-the-controversy-over-the-number-of-ice-removals/ [http://
perma.cc/GMH2-KGBG].
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IV. RESTRICTING EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR ASYLUM
SEEKERS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED STATES’
APPROACH TO OTHER FORMS OF HUMANITARIANBASED RELIEF UNDER DOMESTIC
IMMIGRATION LAW
United States immigration law is driven by a number of important and
at times conflicting policy goals such as family reunification, strengthening
the economy, protecting the nation’s borders, and providing a safe haven
for those in need. As for the latter category, the United States offers
asylum to those fleeing persecution, T visas to those who escape human
trafficking,119 U visas to victims of violent crimes within the United
States,120 the ability to self-petition for permanent residency for those who
have suffered domestic violence at the hands of an American or lawful
permanent resident spouse,121 and temporary protected status (TPS) to those
who cannot return home due to natural disaster or civil conflict ravaging
their countries.122 While domestic law separates victims into particular

119. A T visa is a non-immigrant visa that provides a way for victims of human
trafficking to remain in the United States and to assist law enforcement in an investigation. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i) (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 1100.27(a)(3) (2014).
120. U visas are nonimmigrant visas that allow victims of violent crime to remain in
the United States and assist in the investigation or prosecution of the crime by law
enforcement. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1)–(2) (2014).
121. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 created a process by which
a battered spouse, child, or parent can obtain legal status by self-petition. Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §§ 801–810, 127 Stat. 54, 110–
18; Battered Spouse, Children & Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Apr. 7,
2011), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/battered-spouse-children-parents [https://perma.cc/
T6KQ-XZNT?type=source]; Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance for Approved Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) Self-Petitioners, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Apr.
11, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141765
43f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2cac37668c779110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchann
el=68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD [http://perma.cc/LT3F-3STV]. It is
intended to be used by those victims whose qualifying family member—whether a United
States citizen or lawful permanent resident—was willfully withholding, or threatening to
“withhold legal immigration sponsorship as a tool of abuse.” Id. Upon a successful grant of a
VAWA petition, that person—as well as any “derivative child”—will be able to apply for
work authorization. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(IV) (2012).
122. Temporary Protected Status is intended to provide a safe haven for those who
may not meet the legal definition of refugee but have fled or cannot return to perilous
conditions in their native countries. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012). Once the USCIS approves
an application for TPS, the applicant is also granted work authorization for the duration of
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categories, in actuality these distinctions are often artificial as an immigrant
can simultaneously be both a trafficking victim and a refugee or a domestic
violence victim and a victim of a violent crime. For example, take the
case of a woman who flees an abusive relationship in Guatemala believing
she is coming to the United States as a nanny when in actuality she is held
captive by her employer and not paid for her labor. This immigrant
woman could seek asylum protection based on the domestic violence she
suffered in Guatemala and also seek a T visa as a victim of human trafficking
in the United States. If she was subjected to domestic violence in the United
States, she could also seek a U visa for victims of violent crime. If her
abuser was also her spouse and a United States citizen or lawful permanent
resident, she could self-petition for permanent residency. If her country
was designated for protection while she was in the United States, she
could also seek TPS.
United States law allows for employment authorization in all of these
humanitarian-based situations. In some of these categories, like TPS, the
processing time is relatively fast so that applicants are not left for long
without the ability to support themselves.123 In other situations, the
processing can be slow124 or there are limits on how many visas can be
allocated per year.125 In order to address these situations, United States
law either allows for employment authorization in the interim period (as

his or her country’s designation as an unsafe state. LISA SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS: CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
ISSUES (2015).
123. Processing time for employment authorization based on TPS is generally three
months. See USCIS Processing Time Information for the Vermont Service Center, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (May 12, 2015), https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processing
TimesDisplay.do [https://perma.cc/SDU6-J5XN].
124. For example, applicants for U visas are currently waiting approximately thirteen
months for approval and concomitant employment authorization; T visa applicants are
currently waiting about four months for approval and employment authorization. Id.
125. There are only 10,000 U visas available per year, and they are taken very
quickly. Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-traffickingother-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activityu-nonimmigrant-status [http://perma.cc/L3YM-2HN7] (last updated Jan. 9, 2014).
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with U visas),126 or allows for public benefits (as with T visas)127 and
VAWA petitions.128 Only when it comes to refugees seeking asylum does
126. USCIS may grant conditional work authorization to applicants in excess of the
10,000 cap if there is a bona fide U visa application pending before USCIS. 8 U.S.C. §
1184(p)(6) (2012). An application is considered bona fide when USCIS determines that
it is not fraudulent, is complete and properly filed, contains the requisite certification by
law enforcement, is accompanied by fingerprint and background checks, and “established
prima facie eligibility for” U visa status. See SUZANNE B. SELTZER ET AL., NY ANTITRAFFICKING NETWORK, IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR CRIME VICTIMS: THE U VISTA MANUAL Aiv (2010), available at http://aaldef.org/docs/U-Visa-Manual.pdf [http://perma.cc/NM46RQ7U]. Even prior to the full implementation of the U visa program, USCIS took steps
to ensure that potential U visa applicants would not be left without the ability to work.
From 2000 until 2009, USCIS granted interim relief, which allowed those individuals who
were U visa-eligible to receive work authorization and additional benefits. USCIS Update:
U Nonimmigrant Interim Relief Recipients Reminded To Apply for U Visa, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66
f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=1c4cb1be1ce85210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&v
gnextchannel=68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD [http://perma.cc/Y27KSPPA] (last updated Dec. 14, 2009). Upon the interim relief program’s conclusion, benefit
recipients were encouraged to apply for the U visa; those who already had pending applications
were allowed to continue receiving benefits until their applications were adjudicated. Id.
127. Victims of human trafficking are afforded an alternative form of temporary
immigration status called “continued presence.” 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3) (2008). To
receive continued presence, a law enforcement official must submit an application to the
Secretary of Homeland Security certifying that a person “is a victim of a severe form of
trafficking and may be a potential witness to such trafficking,” which would require that
the person remain in the United States for one year, subject to renewal, to assist in investigation
and prosecution. § 7105(c)(3)(A)(i); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Continued
Presence: Temporary Immigration Status for Victims of Human Trafficking, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (July 2010) [hereinafter Continued Presence], http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/blue-campaign/BC_Continued_Presence.pdf [http://perma.cc/
FX2K-AZB2]. Upon a successful grant of continued presence, the person will be able to
obtain state and federal benefits as well as work authorization. § 7105(b)(1)(A); Continued
Presence, supra; 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35 (2014). A decision on employment authorization
usually takes three months from the date of application for authorization. USCIS Processing
Time Information for the Vermont Service Center, supra note 123.
128. VAWA self-petitioners can receive benefits while their claims are processed.
See CECILIA OLAVARRIA ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT, PUBLIC
BENEFITS ACCESS FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN AND CHILDREN 2 (2013), available
at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/public-benefits/benefits-for-qualified-immigrants/4.2_
PB_BB-PublBens_for_Imm_Women_and_Children-MANUAL-BB.pdf [http://perma.cc/
T84Y-RYL5]. Indeed, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (PRWORA) recognized that certain classes of immigrants might be unable to
support themselves and so provided for those “qualified immigrants” to receive certain
public benefits. Id. An individual petitioning under VAWA may receive benefits if the
individual’s application contains a prima facie showing of VAWA eligibility, the individual has
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United States law leave the applicant for prolonged periods of time
without either the ability to work or access to social services.129 While it
is true that asylum seekers are eligible to seek employment authorization
after six months, this is only available for those few who have never
requested additional time to prepare their cases.130 For those who were
offered a quick asylum interview or hearing, but needed more time to
adequately prepare their case, they are left in limbo without a means to
survive for an indefinite period. This punitive aspect of United States asylum
law is inconsistent with other areas of law and places an undue burden on
one sub-category of vulnerable immigrants in need of protection.
V. THE RESTRICTION ON EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION UNDERMINES
THE STATUTORY RIGHTS TO SEEK ASYLUM AND TO
OBTAIN COUNSEL
Congress enacted the Refugee Act in 1980 in order to give “statutory
meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian
concerns.”131 The Refugee Act for the first time created a statutory right
to seek asylum.132 Although not required to do so pursuant to the Refugee
been battered or subject to extremely cruel treatment by a United States citizen or lawful
permanent resident, there is a demonstrated connection between the abuse and the necessity of
public benefits, and the individual does not live with his or her abuser. Interim Guidance
on Verification of Citizenship, Qualified Alien Status and Eligibility Under Title IV of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 62 Fed. Reg.
61,344, 61,366 (Nov. 17, 1997). Those persons who meet the requirements are allowed access
to “federal means-tested public benefits, [other] federal public benefits, and federally funded
social service programs.” OLAVARRIA ET AL., supra, at 7.
129. Perhaps a reason for allowing broader benefits for T and U visa applicants is
because they are not solely humanitarian-based. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act (T and U Visas), IMMIGR. CENTER FOR WOMEN & CHILDREN, http://icwclaw.
org/services-available/victims-of-trafficking-and-violence-protection-act-t-and-u-visas [http://
perma.cc/6984-5EUY] (last visited June 9, 2015). Rather, T and U visas are also aimed
at assisting law enforcement in the prosecution of criminals. Id. However, the VAWA
self-petition visas are solely humanitarian. See Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance for
Approved Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Self-Petitioners, supra note 121. Moreover,
asylum seekers sued to be afforded the right to work before it was dramatically curtailed
in 1995. See AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 15.
130. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
131. Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United States:
The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 303,
313 (2001) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 141 (1980)).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) provides that, “[a]ny alien who is physically present in
the United States or who arrives in the United States . . . irrespective of such alien’s status,
may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b)
of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012). According to David Martin, “It is indeed quite
plausible to read Congress’s enactment of [section] 208 in 1980 as creating a right for
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Act of 1980, the INS promulgated regulations allowing for both a right to
counsel—as long as there is no cost to the government or undue delay133 and
a right to employment authorization in non-frivolous cases—at the
discretion of the District Director.134
The INS initially retained discretion to decide work authorization requests
while asylum claims were pending on a case by case basis.135 However,
in Diaz v. INS, a class of asylum seekers, largely from Central America,
challenged the district director’s use of restrictive criteria to deny or revoke
work authorization.136 The Court initially noted that “the INS may not
have been required to enact regulations permitting aliens to work while
awaiting a decision on their political asylum applications.”137 However,
in enjoining the INS from denying employment authorization based on
restrictive factors, the Court held that once the agency chose to promulgate a
regulation, it had an obligation to follow it.138
Within a year after the Diaz decision, the INS issued new nondiscretionary
regulations in 1987, making the right to seek work authorization nearly
automatic for refugees seeking asylum.139 Noting the significance of the
new nondiscretionary employment authorization procedure, David Martin
advised:
If work authorization is now to be denied, any lawyer for the Department of
Justice is bound to be asked in court how the government expects asylum seekers to
survive during the months (and possibly years) until a final ruling is obtained on
the application. Unless the government takes further steps to provide for such

persons physically present in the United States to have their asylum claims heard on the
merits.” David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1374 (1990).
133. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
135. The applicable regulations provided that “[a]ny alien who has filed a nonfrivolous application for asylum pursuant to Part 208 of this chapter may be granted
permission to be employed for the period of time necessary to decide the case.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 109.1(b)(2) (1986). Section 208.4 provided that “[u]pon the filing of a non-frivolous I589, the district director may, in his discretion, grant a request by the applicant for
employment authorization.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (1986) (cited by Diaz v. INS, 684 F. Supp.
638, 646 (E.D. Cal. 1986)).
136. Diaz, 648 F. Supp. at 641.
137. Id. at 647.
138. Id. (citing Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 746 F.2d 466, 474 (9th Cir. 1984)).
139. Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,216, 16,221 (May 1, 1987) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a); Martin, supra note 132, at 1374.
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people during the pendency of the claim, the lawyer has no respectable answer.
Courts might easily conclude that the government was trying to starve people out
of pursuing a congressionally mandated right. And they would surely point out
that a no-work authorization policy falls as heavily on bona fide refugees as on
the abusers who are the ostensible targets.140

Notwithstanding Martin’s admonition, the INS changed course in 1995
and instituted the present policy of disallowing work authorization for at
least 180 days.141 During this period, the United States does not “take[]
further steps to provide for such people . . .” arguably leaving a government
lawyer in the same unanswerable position as Martin hypothesized about in
1990.142 The current bar on employment authorization for at least six months
is indeed an attempt to “starve people out of pursuing a congressionally
mandated right.”143
As noted, Congress has also provided a right to counsel in immigration
proceedings, so long as there is no cost to the government or undue
delay.144 In recognition of the intricacy of asylum law and the difference
that having a lawyer can make in the process, the asylum application itself
contains the following admonition: “Immigration law concerning asylum
and withholding of removal or deferral of removal is complex. You have a
right to provide your own legal representation at an asylum interview and
during immigration proceedings before the Immigration Court at no cost
to the U.S. government.”145 Indeed, studies have shown that having
counsel dramatically increases the likelihood of prevailing in an asylum
claim.146 Unfortunately, there are extremely limited options for obtaining
free legal representation in asylum cases.147
140. Martin, supra note 132, at 1374 (citations omitted). Martin also warned that,
“At times of heavy influx, a policy of near-automatic work authorizations may well be
ended, but the government must then provide alternative arrangements for feeding and
housing the asylum seekers.” Id.
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2012).
142. Martin, supra note 132, at 1374.
143. Id.
144. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (2014).
145. See I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, Instructions,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf [http://perma.cc/BX3F-KD7C].
146. See e.g., Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration
Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2008)
(finding that “asylum seekers represented by counsel were three times more likely to
succeed in their claim than pro se applicants”).
147. Under 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3, recipients of Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
funds “may not provide legal assistance for or on behalf of an ineligible alien.” 45 C.F.R. §
1626.3 (2014). This applies also to any non-LSC funds that LSC-funded institutions could
use. See id. There is an exception to this, termed the Kennedy Amendment Provision, which
“permits LSC recipients to use non-LSC funds to provide legal assistance to ineligible aliens
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Because the likelihood of securing a pro bono lawyer is so remote, the
bar on employment authorization results in a de facto bar on representation
by counsel. Given the complexity of asylum law, undermining the ability to
afford a lawyer dramatically decreases the likelihood of gaining asylum.
If the statutory right to seek asylum is to have any real meaning, the United
States should either provide free counsel or allow asylum seekers to work
so they can hire lawyers.
VI. IMPOSING DESTITUTION ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IS CONTRARY TO
THE SPIRIT OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
AND CONVENTIONS
A. Denying Access to Employment and Benefits Can Rise to a Level of
Constructive Refoulement as Prohibited by the
Refugee Convention
In addition to undermining the statutory right to seek asylum and obtain
counsel, denying refugees the ability to work, without providing any
alternative way to provide for the costs of living while seeking asylum,
threatens to eviscerate the very essence of the Refugee Convention.
Although the Refugee Convention does not explicitly require signatory
states to provide for the right to work for asylum seekers, failing to
provide asylum seekers with any lawful means of basic sustenance for at
least six months undermines the ability to seek protection, which is at the
core of the Refugee Convention. International law precludes state parties
from attaching reservations or understandings that undermine the purpose
of the treaty or convention being ratified.148 As a state party to the U.N.

who are the victims of domestic abuse when the legal assistance is ‘directly related to the
prevention of, or obtaining relief from,’ the abuse.” Restrictions on Legal Assistance to Aliens,
62 Fed. Reg. 19,409, 19,410 (Apr. 21, 1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1626).
148. See Leo R. McIntyre III, Comment, Of Treaties and Reservations: The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Juvenile Death Penalty in
the United States, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 147, 155–56 (2003) (citing Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VV9Y-T579]). Another fundamental tenet of international law is that if a
reservation to a treaty is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty, it will be found
invalid. Vienna Convention, supra (“A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting,
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Protocol on Refugees, the United States must act consistently with the
spirit of the Convention. By enacting a set of laws and adopting policies
that simultaneously preclude those who come forward to seek refugee status
from any lawful means of economic survival for at least six months, the
United States is undermining the purpose of the Refugee Convention and
constructively refouling those who cannot sustain themselves.
The Refugee Convention provides that, “[n]o Contracting State shall
expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.”149 This obligation is not limited solely to
recognized refugees, but applies to asylum seekers as well.150
The question is whether compelling asylum seekers to live in destitution
for a minimum of six months—most often for much greater periods—and
making it almost impossible for them to afford lawyers essentially forces
them to return to their home countries and thus, amounts to constructive
refoulement under the Refugee Convention. James Hathaway has remarked
that “[i]n some cases, depriving refugees of the necessities of life may
give rise to a breach of the duty of non-refoulement. Repatriation under
coercion, including situations in which refugees are left with no real option
but to leave, is in breach of Art. 33 of the Refugee Convention.”151 The
United Nations High Commission on Refugees has also noted that States
limit socio-economic opportunities for refugees in order to “promote early
repatriation.”152 Although there is a paucity of scholarly literature discussing

approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless . . . the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”).
149. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 429 (V), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.2/108, at 29 (July 28, 1951) available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.
html [http://perma.cc/CQN4-PFNL].
150. See Ryszard Cholewinski, Enforced Destitution of Asylum Seekers in the United
Kingdom: The Denial of Fundamental Human Rights, 10 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 462, 487
(1998).
151. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
464 (2005). See also Merrill Smith, Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, A Waste
of Humanity, WORLD REFUGEE SURV., 2004, at 38–39, available at http://www.uscri
refugees.org/2010Website/5_Resources/5_5_Refugee_Warehousing/5_5_3_Translations
/Warehousing_Refugees_A_Denial_of_Rights.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XGX-4U72] (arguing that
denial of necessary socio-economic support to refugees constitutes constructive refoulement
under international law).
152. U.N. High Comm’r on Refugees, Global Consultations on International
Protection, Local Integration, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/02/6 (Apr. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3ccd64536.pdf [http://perma.cc/3HYD-YM6Y] (last accessed June
9, 2015).
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what constitutes constructive refoulement under the Refugee Convention,
various international tribunals have interpreted the term.
For example, in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) was faced with a claim of constructive refoulement
based upon Italy’s action in intercepting and forcibly pushing a boat of
Somalian and Eritrean asylum seekers, who had fled from Libya in hopes
of seeking asylum in Italy, back to Libya.153 In ruling that Italy’s actions
in intercepting and pushing back the asylum seekers to Libya (a country
that was not even a signatory to the Refugee Convention) were in clear
violation of the protection against refoulement, the ECHR based its decision
upon the doctrine of constructive refoulement.154
In Regina v. Secretary of State for Social Security, the United Kingdom
Court of Appeal struck down regulations that excluded any asylum seeker
who did not lodge an application upon entry to the United Kingdom from
accessing previously available economic benefits.155 The Court gave
weight to the concerns of the United Nations High Commission on
Refugees [UNHCR] that:
[A]sylum seekers may be forced into unlawful exploitative conditions to support
themselves whilst exercising their appeal rights. It is difficult to speculate on the
range of illegal activities that increasingly desperate persons may resort to, but
these are likely to include unlawful employment, dishonesty offences and perhaps
more serious criminality involving drugs, prostitution or violent crimes.156

In the UNHCR’s opinion, “this could amount to ‘constructive refoulement’
and may place the United Kingdom in violation of its obligations under
the Refugee Convention.”157 In striking down the regulations, the Court
concluded that, “the Regulations necessarily contemplate for some a life
so destitute that to my mind no civilized nation can tolerate it.”158 The
Court aptly noted the Hobsian choice facing asylum seekers: “[T]he need
153. Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 97, 107.
154. Id. at 154.
155. R v. Sec’y of State for Soc. Sec. ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of
Immigrants, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275 (A.C.) at 293 (Eng.).
156. Id. at 289. The Court explained that “[s]uch activity could bring them into
conflict with the law and undermine the delicate balance of reciprocity that exists between
the State offering asylum and the asylum-seeker. Confronted with these choices even
genuine but desperate refugees might be compelled to return to face persecution in the
country of origin, rather than remain in an impossible position in the United Kingdom.” Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 292.
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either to abandon their claims to refugee status or alternatively to maintain
them as best they can but in a state of utter destitution.”159
Furthermore, while silent on the issue of socioeconomic rights for
asylum seekers, the Refugee Convention does generally mandate a broad
spectrum of socio-economic rights for refugees. For example, Article 17
guarantees “lawfully staying” refugees “the right to wage-earning
employment” (with the most favorable terms afforded to nationals of other
countries).160 The Refugee Convention also guarantees “lawfully staying”
refugees additional socio-economic rights including the right to housing161
and to social security.162 The question is whether the term “lawfully
staying” can be interpreted to include asylum seekers.
Some refugee scholars interpret lawful presence as implying “admission in
accordance with the applicable immigration law, for a temporary purpose,
for example, as a student, visitor, or recipient of medical attention.”163
However, at least one prominent refugee scholar has argued that once an
asylum seeker lodges an application for asylum, the asylum seeker should
be considered to be in lawful presence. According to Hathaway, “lawful
presence is an intermediary category which occupies the ground between
illegal presence on the one hand, and a right to stay on the other.”164
Independent experts have also concluded:
The meaning of the term ‘lawful’ must be ascertained in accordance with a good faith
interpretation of the Refugee Convention, and in light of human rights treaties
that protect rights on the basis of physical presence and the premise of equality.
If a refugee’s presence in the territory of a state party to the Convention is not
unlawful, in that the state is aware, or should be aware, of the refugee’s presence
and the state is unable or unwilling to remove the refugee, then the refugee’s
presence may be regarded as lawful for purposes of the Refugee Convention.165

While asylum seekers are not generally considered to be lawfully staying
for purposes of the rights to employment, housing, or social security under
the Refugee Convention, an argument can be made that asylum seekers who
159. Id. at 293.
160. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 149, at 22.
161. Id. at 23.
162. Id. at 24–25.
163. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 11, at 524. The authors note that
Canada, in its reservation to Articles 23 and 24, stated that “it interprets lawfully staying
as referring only to refugees admitted for permanent residence; refugees admitted for
temporary residence are to be accorded the same treatment with respect to those articles
as is accorded to visitors generally.” Id. at 526 n.105.
164. HATHAWAY, supra note 151, at 183.
165. PENELOPE MATHEW, REWORKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASYLUM AND
EMPLOYMENTS 81 (2012) (citing Colloquium, The Michigan Guidelines on the Right To
Work, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 293, 298 (2010)).
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are forced to wait months or years for a determination on their asylum
applications should be deemed lawfully staying and entitled to the more
robust protections afforded to these longer-term refugees.166
1. United Nations Convention Against Torture
As a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the
United States is obligated under Article 3 not to return anyone to a country
“where there are substantial grounds for believing that individual would
be . . . subject[] to torture.”167 The only way to apply for protection under
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture is to apply for asylum.168
Under United States immigration law, an application for asylum is
automatically considered also to be an application for protection under
the Convention Against Torture (also known as the Torture Convention).169
The same rules apply in terms of not being entitled to public benefits or
authorized to work for at least 180 days.170 Therefore, by depriving those
who fear torture or the ability to survive while their claims proceed, the
United States may also be engaged in constructive return in violation of
its obligations under the Torture Convention.
B. Interpretations under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
Although the United States has not ratified the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), it nevertheless
provides a useful lens for examining the human rights violations inherent in

166. Asylum seekers who have lodged applications are normally considered to be
“lawfully present” rather than “lawfully staying” as the latter designation contemplates a
more significant duration and purpose than a period of lawful presence. MATHEW, supra
note 165, at 87.
167. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture].
168. See I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, Instructions,
supra note 145.
169. Id.
170. Asylum and Withholding of Removal Relief: Convention Against Torture
Protections Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/eoir/press/09/AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf [http://perma.cc/TV66PPKE].
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keeping asylum seekers in a state of destitution. Under the ICESCR,
member states must ensure that everyone has the same right to an adequate
standard of living, including the right to work, the right to adequate health
care, and the right to social security.171 If a member state, through direct
discrimination or omission, fails to uphold these rights for asylum seekers, it
may be in violation of its obligations under the ICESCR. In addition, the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
clarified that a member state breaches its obligations under the ICESCR
when it changes policy and legislation in such a way as to cause a “decline
in living and housing conditions” beyond minimum standards.172
C. The European Court on Human Rights and the Right to Be Free of
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The European Court of Human Rights is developing an important body of
jurisprudence in cases alleging that a state’s failure to provide adequate
employment opportunities and subsistence benefits to asylum seekers
constitutes inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment as proscribed
by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While there
is no positive obligation on the State to ensure that everyone has adequate
housing and sufficient resources to survive, the Court has recognized asylum
seekers as a particularly vulnerable group deserving of greater protections.173
The Court has also distinguished between the lack of a positive duty to
ensure that all have adequate resources and situations in which the state’s
laws or policies create a situation of destitution for asylum seekers. For
example, in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Limbuela, an asylum seeker challenged legislation that prohibited
the Secretary of State from providing accommodations and basic economic
support to refugees who did not immediately seek asylum.174 The legislation
similarly barred such asylum seekers from working to support themselves.175
The House of Lords held that placing asylum seekers who did not apply
right away in a state of destitution by denying them welfare benefits, the
171. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 6(1), 9,
12, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
172. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, P11, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991).
173. See R v. Sec’y of State for Soc. Sec. ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of
Immigrants, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275 (A.C.) at 289 (Eng.).
174. R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t ex parte Limbuela, [2005] UKHL 66,
[2006] 1 A.C. 396 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), available at http://www.escr-net.org/
sites/default/files/Decision%20Limbuela%20%28en%20ingles%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/
CG7A-KD6C].
175. Id. at 2.
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right to work, and access to other forms of social support violated Article 3.176
As Lord Bingham explained:
[T]reatment is inhumane or degrading if, to a seriously detrimental extent, it
denies the most basic needs of any human being . . . A general public duty to
house the homeless or provide for the destitute could not be spelled out of Article
3. But I have no doubt that the threshold may be crossed if a person with no
means and no alternative sources of support, unable to support himself, is, by the
deliberate action of the state, denied shelter, food or the most basic necessities of
life.”177

Similarly, in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, the European Court of Human
Rights assessed the state’s role in creating a situation in which vulnerable
asylum seekers were left destitute.178 As explained by the Court:
the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability as
an asylum seeker and must be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the
situation in which he has found himself for several months, living in the street,
with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of
providing for his essential needs.179

The Court noted that the applicant had “been the victim of humiliating
treatment showing a lack of respect for his dignity and that this situation . . .
without doubt, aroused in him feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority
capable of inducing desperation.”180 The Court concluded that “such living
conditions, combined with the prolonged uncertainty in which [the applicant]
remained and the total lack of any prospects of his situation improving,
have attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of
Article 3 of the Convention.181
Similarly, in R v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint
Consul for the Welfare of Immigrants, the Judge cautioned that,
“[p]arliament cannot have intended a significant number of genuine
asylum seekers to be impaled on the horns of so intolerable a dilemma:

176. Id. at 3.
177. Id. at 4. As explained by Lord Bingham, treatment must reach a minimum level of
severity in order to be proscribed by Article 3. Id. Moreover, when the treatment at issue does
not involve “deliberate infliction of pain or suffering, the threshold is a high one.” Id.
178. M.S.S. v. Belg. & Greece, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 93 (2011).
179. Id. at 53.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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the need to either abandon their claims to refugee status or alternatively
to maintain them as best they can but in a state of utter destitution.”182
In R (on the application of Q) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, the Court once again found that excluding destitute asylum
seekers from governmental assistance violated Article 3’s prohibition
against inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.183 As the Court
explained:
It is clear that there is no duty on a state to provide a home. It may even be that
there is no duty to provide any form of social security. But the situation here is
different since asylum seekers are forbidden to work and so cannot provide for
themselves. Unless they can find friends or charitable bodies or persons, they
will indeed be destitute. They will suffer at least damage to their health.184

In the United States, even if the system functioned perfectly, asylum
seekers would be forced to survive without working or accessing any
public benefits until at least six months after they file for asylum.185 Based
on the jurisprudence interpreting Article 3’s prohibition on inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment, it seems unlikely that a six-month bar
would be considered a per se violation. However, in cases involving a
particularly traumatized individual or applicants without any charitable
assistance, a six-month period of destitution might well constitute the type of
dehumanizing treatment prohibited under the European Convention on
Human Rights. Moreover, the reality is that asylum seekers in the United
States most often endure much longer periods of time without access to
employment or benefits. Based on the jurisprudence from the ECHR and the
United Kingdom, the longer the period of deprivation of a means of
support, the more likely it constitutes inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment.
VII. DENYING A RIGHT TO WORK IS PARTICULARLY HARSH FOR
ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO ARE ALSO DENIED ACCESS TO
PUBLIC BENEFITS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
The confluence of immigration, public benefits, and health care laws and
policies in the United States leaves asylum seekers outside of the realms
of both gainful employment and public benefits. In addition to being

182. R v. Sec’y of State for Soc. Sec. ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of
Immigrants, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275 (A.C.) at 293 (Eng.).
183. R ex rel. Q v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 195
(Eng.).
184. Id.
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2012).
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prohibited from working for at least 180 days, asylum seekers in the United
States are also barred from receiving federal public benefits.186 The illusive
safety net remains out of reach for asylum seekers without employment
authorization, even when it comes to buying subsidized health insurance
through the Affordable Care Act.187 While a handful of states provide
social services to needy asylum seekers, the vast majority do not, leaving
asylum seekers in an extremely vulnerable situation.188
Countries around the world are searching for ways to deter asylum
seekers, and some impose wait times for employment authorization that
are as long, if not longer, than in the United States.189 For example, even
the new European Union Directive, which is scheduled to come into effect in
July 2015, will only guarantee that asylum seekers have access to the labor
market “no later than 9 months from the date when the application for
186. 8 U.S.C. §1611(a) (2012). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) includes asylum seekers within the definition of
non-qualified immigrants who are explicitly excluded from social benefits. See Karina
Fortuny & Ajay Chaudry, Overview of Immigrants’ Eligibility for SNAP, TANF, MEDICAID,
and CHIP, ASPE I SSUE B RIEF , Mar. 2012, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/11/
ImmigrantAccess/Eligibility/ib.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KVC-95SX].
187. Only those asylum seekers with employment authorization are considered to be
lawfully present under the Affordable Care Act. See “Lawfully Present” Individuals
Eligible under the Affordable Care Act, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (Sept. 2012), available
at http://www.nilc.org/lawfullypresent.html [http://perma.cc/5JQL-B84N].
188. Only California, Hawaii, Minnesota, New York, and Washington allow asylum
seekers to access social benefits through the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) program. Fortuny & Chaudry, supra note 186, at 4. Although sixteen states and
the District of Columbia provide some state-funded health assistance to particular subgroups of asylum seekers, such as the elderly or children, most asylum seekers are precluded
from coverage. Tanya Broder & Jonathan Blazer, Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for
Federal Programs, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (last revised Oct. 2011), available at http://
www.nilc.org/overview-immeligfedprograms.html [http://perma.cc/ QQH5-537D].
189. However, some nations allow for an immediate right to work. For example,
Greece permits almost immediate access to the labor market (after the initial interview,
which is supposed to occur within two months from filing the asylum application).
MATHEW, supra note 165, at 27. With the exception of unskilled or farm labor, however,
preference in employment is given to Greeks, EU nationals, recognized refugees or persons of
Greek descent. Id. In Spain, asylum seekers can work for six months after applying for
asylum. Id. at 28. In Portugal, asylum seekers can work once a decision on admissibility
is made, which must occur within twenty days of filing the application. Id. Austria permits
asylum seekers to work or be self-employed three months after applying for asylum.
However, in practice, only seasonal employment is permitted. Id. Self-employment as a paper
boy is also allowed, as is prostitution and work in reception centers for those who are
detained there. Id.
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international protection was lodged if a first instance decision by the
competent authority has not been taken and the delay cannot be attributed
to the applicant.”190
Outside of the European Union, some nations impose even greater wait
times before asylum seekers are permitted to work. For example, in the United
Kingdom, asylum seekers can only seek employment authorization after a
year if there has been no delay attributable to the asylum seeker and the
employment is limited to sectors with a labor shortage.191 Asylum seekers
in the United Kingdom are also not allowed to be self-employed or start a
business.192 Slovenia permits access to the labor market after nine months, as
long as identity can be established and delay is not attributable to the asylum
seeker.193
While many countries impose wait times on the right to work for asylum
seekers, the United States stands alone in simultaneously denying access to
social benefits and leaving asylum seekers in an enforced state of
destitution. For example, when the European Union implements its new
Directive in July 2015, it will require states to provide financial and social
benefits consistent with international human rights law.194 Article 17 of
the Reception Directive guarantees financial social assistance and access
to health care.195 The United Kingdom permits asylum seekers to obtain
benefits such as free health care, legal counsel, and housing if they establish
financial need.196
In Australia, mandatory detention and a policy of deterrence predominate
when it comes to unauthorized asylum seekers. Those asylum seekers that
arrive lawfully in Australia may be allowed a bridging visa in order to
work. However, boat arrivals can only seek a Bridging Visa E that
requires a “compelling need to work.”197 But even here, in the context of a
more restrictive legal framework for seeking asylum, the Australian
government, working with the Red Cross, uses a number of programs to
190. Council Directive 2013/33/EU, art.15, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 96, 104 (effective July
2015), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/51d29db54.html [http://perma.cc/85NP6TUN].
191. MATHEW, supra note 165, at 27.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 27. In Cyprus, employment is allowed after an asylum application has
been pending for six months, but only in high-demand sectors such as “garbage collection,
cleaning and food delivery.” Id. In Belgium, asylum seekers can seek a special work
permit after six months of a pending asylum application. Id. at 28.
194. See Council Directive 2013/33/EU, supra note 190.
195. MATHEW, supra note 165, at 26.
196. Benefits & Credits: Asylum Support, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/asylumsupport/print [https://perma.cc/ZWD6-EYYS].
197. MATHEW, supra note 165, at 33.
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provide “medical care, immigration advice and financial assistance.”198
In New Zealand, non-detained asylum seekers may be issued a work
permit, and if they “cannot find work, social assistance and access to some
health services is available.”199 In Canada, asylum seekers who cannot
support themselves without working may apply for a work permit.200 Social
assistance is also available to asylum seekers, such as social security,
healthcare and legal representation.201
In addition to recognizing that asylum seekers must be afforded benefits if
they are not permitted to work, courts have also assessed the constitutionality of
providing less support to asylum seekers than to citizens. For example, in
2012, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany faced a challenge to
the disparity between benefits allowed to asylum seekers as compared
with citizens.202 Germany reduced the amount of cash assistance available
by fifteen percent in an effort to avoid attracting asylum seekers.203 The
Court held that it was unconstitutional for Germany to allocate cash
benefits to asylum seekers that were “insufficient to guarantee a dignified
minimum existence.”204 In ordering the German government to increase its
cash allocations to asylum seekers, the Court relied on the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to hold that “[h]uman
dignity may not be relativized by migration-policy considerations.”205

198. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 47.
199. MATHEW, supra note 165, at 34.
200. Id. at 35.
201. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 46. However, refugee claims from
countries that Canada deems safe “cannot apply for work permits while their cases are
being processed.” Number of Asylum Claimants Plummeting in Canada, CTV NEWS (Feb. 21,
2013), http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/number-of-asylum-claimants-plummeting-in-canada1.1166984# [http://perma.cc/YV2D-LWCM].
202. See Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court in the Proceeding 1 BvL
10/10, ESCR-NET, http://www.escr-net.org/node/364979 [http://perma.cc/77Q4-JU6E]
(last visited May 15, 2015).
203. Today’s Front Pages, VOXEUROP (July 19, 2012), http://www.voxeurop.eu/
en/content/todays-front-pages/2374811-todays-front-pages [http://perma.cc/F9YX-734E].
204. Judgment of 18 July 2012 - 1 BvL 10/10, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2012/07/ls201
20718_1bvl001010en.html [http://perma.cc/9MSP-D3PV] (last visited June 9, 2015).
205. Id.
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VIII. DENYING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION
UNDERMINES IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY GOALS
In addition to the moral and human rights-based arguments that focus
on the rights of the asylum seeker, there are also strong arguments to be
made that allowing asylum seekers to work benefits the host country. For
example, studies show that allowing refugees and asylum seekers to work
facilitates assimilation, and furthers a sense of self-sufficiency for the
asylum seeker or refugee.206 It is for this very reason that the United States
encourages refugees to work upon arrival. As explained by the U.S.
Department of State, “Based on years of experience, the U.S. refugee
resettlement program has found that people learn English and begin to
function comfortably much faster if they start work soon after arrival.”207
This is equally true for asylum seekers who have not yet been formally
recognized as refugees.
In contrast, requiring asylum seekers to remain idle may well lead to
societal costs. In most countries, when the government prohibits asylum
seekers from supporting themselves, it assumes the role of providing for
them.208 For countries like the United States, which prohibit work and fail to
provide benefits, asylum seekers are left with little alternative but to work
illegally.209 Encouraging entrance into the black market leads to
exploitation by unscrupulous employers as well as depression of wages
and working conditions for all workers.210
Tribunals around the world have focused on the connection between
dignity and the right to work in the context of asylum seekers. In a recent
case in South Korea, an asylum seeker, with a deportation order for violating a
law that restricted asylum seekers from working for the first year after
filing an asylum claim, brought suit against the head of the Seoul Immigration
Office.211 In granting the asylum seeker’s challenge and canceling the
deportation order, the Judge explained:

206. For example, a 2004 study on refugees and social exclusion in Australia discusses
how poverty contributes to social exclusion of refugees. Janet Taylor, Refugees and Social
Exclusion: What the Literature Says, 36 MIGRATION ACTION, no. 2, 2004, at 16, 16–31.
207. The Reception and Placement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm [http://perma.cc/DGG4-QFGB] (last visited Feb.
27, 2015).
208. See, e.g., supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text.
209. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 24.
210. Id. at 33–35; Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The
Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345
(2001).
211. Migrants and Refugees, GONGGAM HUMAN RIGHTS LAW FOUNDATION,
http://www.kpil.org/opboard/viewbody.php?code=eRefugees&page=1&id=16&number=16
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The Korean government did not provide any financial support for refugee applicants.
When it prohibits all work under these circumstances, the survival of refugee
applicants has to depend on the goodwill of philanthropic organizations or nongovernmental organizations for refugees. This policy runs against the spirit of the
Constitution of a civilized country, which should protect the dignity of humans
and ensure their right to survival.212

The Judge also noted that by ordering deportation on the basis of the
plaintiff working outside of the permitted period, the Immigration Office
“ignored the dignity of refugee applicants as humans and only emphasized
the administrative consistency and expediency.”213 According to the Judge,
“[t]his act is illegal, because the harm that it does to the plaintiff is
significantly greater than the public benefit that it achieves.”214
Regarding concerns about the abuse of the refugee application process,
the Court responded that the lengthy waiting period should not be used as a
reason to disadvantage refugee applicants, as one of its main causes is
delay on the part of the administration:
This problem should be solved by hiring more examiners, shortening the time it
takes for the refugee status determination process, or setting up complementary
instruments to remove the benefits of abusing the refugee application process. If
the government assumes that all refugee applicants are not refugees until they are
recognized, and prevents them from working without providing them with
financial support, it practically neglects its obligation to protect refugees of good
standing. Justice delayed is justice denied.215

The Court emphasized that it is a fundamental issue “that exceptions to
the principle of non-refoulement must be very strictly applied.”216
In contrast, in Minster of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka, the Supreme
Court of Appeal of South Africa distinguished between the right to work
as a means of self-fulfillment and the right to work as the sole means to
survive.217 Although the Court equated the right to work as a means of

&keyfield=&keyword=&category=&BoardType=&admin= [http://perma.cc/Z5ZU-X3GA]
(last visited June 9, 2015).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. The appellant in this case was a widowed asylum seeker who needed to work
in order to provide for herself and her 20 year old disabled son who had fled with her from
their native country. Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka 2004 (1) All SA 21 (SCA) (S.
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fulfillment with the paramount right to human dignity at the heart of the
Constitution, it held that even such essential human rights could be
curtailed in appropriate circumstances under the constitution of South
Africa.218 But, even so, the Court went on to state that “where employment
is the only reasonable means for the person’s support . . . [at] issue is not
merely a restriction upon the person’s capacity for self-fulfillment, but a
restriction upon his or her ability to live without positive humiliation or
degradation.”219
In addition, the denial of work authorization in the United States results
in a denial of critical public benefits.220 For example, an asylum seeker
with work authorization is eligible to buy into subsidized health insurance
under the exchanges set up through the Affordable Care Act.221 By denying
work authorization to asylum seekers, the United States is interfering with
the ability to purchase health insurance, which violates the human right to
health and results in a commensurate cost to society.222
IX. THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF DELIBERATE DESTITUTION
FURTHER TRAUMATIZES A VULNERABLE POPULATION
IN NEED OF PROTECTION
The importance of being able to work cannot be disputed. The inability to
work results in a commonly shared experience of feeling devalued by
being denied the opportunity to earn a living as well as the opportunity for
dignity and worth that work provides. Refugees often suffer from depression
and other mental health problems as a result of the trauma they have
endured in their home countries and the dangers that come with fleeing
and attempting to access a safe country.223 The mental stress and anguish for
Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2003/142.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 2G6QV4DW].
218. The Judge held that, based on notions of sovereignty and self-preservation, South
Africa was entitled, through its constitution, to limit the right to dignity “so as to exclude
from its scope a right on the part of every applicant for asylum to undertake employment—
a limitation that is implied by . . .the Refugees Act, and that has been expressed in the
Standing Committee’s decision.” Id. at 13–14.
219. Id. at 14.
220. Immigration Status and the Marketplace, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.
gov/immigrants/immigration-status/ [https://perma.cc/KY6J-C2K9] (last visited June 9,
2015).
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health: What
Does This Mean for Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (elaborating on
the basis for asserting a right to health under international human rights law).
223. It is well understood that “[s]urvivors of torture often suffer from complex
posttraumatic stress that manifests itself as anxiety, distrust, depression, flashbacks, intrusive
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refugees is often so severe that they consider returning home
notwithstanding the danger that awaits them.224
Such conditions are compounded by a system in which asylum seekers
are forced to live in isolation and poverty.225 Indeed, the lack of work has
“a negative impact on the self-concept.”226 As noted in one study assessing
the mental health needs of asylum seekers in the United Kingdom, “[s]alient
ongoing stressors identified across several studies include delays in the
processing of refugee applications, conflict with immigration officials,
being denied a work permit, unemployment, separation from family, and
loneliness and boredom.”227 Inability to work has also been cited as a major

memories of the traumatic event, concentration and memory problems, and a range of
physical symptoms. Disempowerment of individuals and communities is the goal of torture.”
Mary Fabri et al., Caring for Torture Survivors: The Marjorie Kovler Center, in THE NEW
HUMANITARIANS: INSPIRATION, INNOVATIONS, AND BLUEPRINTS FOR VISIONARIES 157, 157
(Chris E. Stout ed., 2009).
224. “Nostalgia, depression, anxiety, guilt, anger and frustration are so severe that
many refugees toy with the idea of going home even though they fear the consequences.”
Barry N. Stein, The Experience of Being a Refugee: Insights from the Research Literature,
in REFUGEE MENTAL HEALTH IN RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES 5, 14 (Carolyn L. Williams &
Joseph Westermeyer eds., 1986) (citing CHARLES ZWINGMANN & MARIA PFISTERAMMENDE, UPROOTING AND AFTER 8–10, 188 (1973)). The author also notes that, “they
will confront the loss of their culture–their identity, their habits. Every action that used to be
habitual or routine will require careful examination and consideration. Stein, supra at 14
(citing L. Etinger, The Symptomatology of Mental Disease Among Refugees in Norway, 106
J. OF MENTAL SCI. 947, 947–66 (1960); J. EX, ADJUSTMENT AFTER MIGRATION: A
L ONGITUDINAL S TUDY OF THE P ROCESS OF A DJUSTMENT BY R EFUGEES TO A NEW
ENVIRONMENT 98–100 (Dr. G. Beijer ed., 1966)). “Refugees suddenly find themselves
virtual islands in a strange and sometimes hostile sea.” Id. (citing R.M. Mutiso,
Counseling of Refugees in Africa, Paper presented at Pan African Conference on Refugees,
Arusha, Tanzania (1979)). Strains will appear at home because the husband can’t provide,
the women must work and the children don’t respect the old ways. (Hans Hoff, Home and
Identity, in UPROOTING AND RESETTLEMENT 130–41 (1960); Elfan Rees, Common Psychological
Factors in Refugee Problems Throughout the World, in UPROOTING AND RESETTLEMENT
31–43 (1960). Id.
225. Angela Burnett & Michael Peel, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Britain, Health
Needs of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 544, 545 (2001). A study of
immigrants to Canada found that the longer they were unemployed, the more likely they
would suffer from “stress, negative self-concept, alienation from the society, and adaptation
difficulties.” Aycan & Berry, supra note 4, at 241.
226. Id.
227. COLLETT, supra note 13, at 83 (citing Derrick Silove et al., Policies of Deterrence
and the Mental Health of Asylum Seekers, 284 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 604, 606 (2000)).
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factor in the breakdown of refugee families.228 They experience, “erosion
of a sense of identity and independence, feelings of shame at having to
beg and accept hand-outs for their survival, and the inability to integrate
socially and economically into [the host] society.”229
For women asylum seekers, the isolation and trauma are often even
greater as a result of their inability to work. Women asylum seekers live
precarious lives while awaiting protection and are at risk of “physical
assault, sexual harassment, and rape.”230 They “are at special risk both
during flight and in seeking asylum because of the dependency of children
and the sick and disabled on them, and because of their vulnerability to
sexual exploitation.”231 Leaving vulnerable women without the ability to
work lawfully pushes them into even more precarious situations, as they
must either work unlawfully and risk exploitation or live off the assistance
of others.
In contrast, studies have shown that “[r]educing isolation and dependence,
having suitable accommodation, and spending time more creatively
through education or work can often do much to relieve depression and
anxiety.”232
X. CONCLUSION
“UNHCR is of the opinion that within the humanitarian spirit of the
Refugee Convention lies a State’s obligation to ensure that asylum-seekers
enjoy basic subsistence support to sustain them in dignity during this
waiting period.”233
Not allowing asylum seekers to work is often couched in terms of
reducing pull factors and ensuring that economic refugees do not abuse
the asylum system in order to gain work permits. However, not allowing
228. See ANNE MCNEVIN, SEEKING SAFETY, NOT CHARITY: A REPORT IN SUPPORT OF
WORK-RIGHTS FOR ASYLUM-SEEKERS LIVING IN THE COMMUNITY ON BRIDGING VISA E 28
(2005).
229. Id.
230. Burnett & Peel, supra note 225, at 546.
231. COLLETT, supra note 13, at 81 (citing Marjorie A. Muecke, New Paradigms for
Refugee Health Problems, 35 SOC. SCI. & MED. 515, 517–18 (1992)).
232. Burnett & Peel, supra note 225, at 545. “Positive changes can be seen as immigrants
adjust, are reunited with families, and take up educational and employment opportunities.”
Id. (citing J. Shackman & J. Reynolds, Working with Refugees and Torture Survivors: Help
for the Helpers, in MENTAL HEALTH MATTERS: A READER. London: Macmillan, Open
University (Heller T., Reynolds J., Gomm R., Pattison S., eds., 1996).
233. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Representations to the Social
Security Advisory Committee on the “Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous
Amendment Regulations 1995”, (Nov. 10, 1995), available at http://www.refworld.org/
docid/3ae6b31daf.html [http://perma.cc/WZA7-WH3X].
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asylum seekers to work—like mandatory detention of asylum seekers—
does not reach its intended goal and should be viewed as a punitive
measure aimed at discouraging access to asylum in contravention of the
Refugee Convention and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.234
Consistent with these international directives, Congress should act to
rescind the ban on work authorization denials for asylum seekers.

234. Various studies support this conclusion. For example a study in Norway
concluded, “All in all, our findings suggest that the increased restrictions in respect of
permission to work have not proved to be any discouragement to potential asylumseekers.” See Marko Valenta & Kristin Thorshaug, Asylum-Seekers’ Perspectives on
Work and Proof of Identity: The Norwegian Experience, 31 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 76, 87
(2012). Although work is a factor that can attract asylum seekers to a particular country,
restrictions on the right to work will not serve as a deterrent if the employment market
allows for opportunities in the informal labor market. Id. Rational choice theory also
suggests that asylum seekers are concerned with safety, protection, and a better life for
their children. Id. at 89. Whether there is a lawful right to work during the asylum process will
have little deterrent effect. Numerous studies have confirmed that removing the right to work
and social rights has marginal impact on decreasing the number of asylum seekers. Id.
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